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V. CLASsIFIcATIoN.-Chief Justice PARKER (Mitchel v. Beynolds,
1 P. Wins. 181), divides contracts in restraint of trade into two
classes, namely: involuntary and voluntary; the former restraints
arising from, first, grants or charters from the crown ; second, Cus-
toms; and third, by-laws; and the latter comprising those restraints
which arise from the agreement of the parties. Only voluntary
restraints will be treated in this article. 'Voluntary restraints are
sub-divided into, first, general, and second, particular or limited
restraints; which sub-division will be followed.
VI. GENERAL RESTRAINTS.
(a) riterion of Tralidity.-It is exceedingly difficult to lay
down a general rule to cover all classes of cases. Each contract
must rest upon its own peculiar circumstances. The reasonableness
of the limitation is the criterion of validity. Many cases have made
the extent of territory covered by the prohibition the final and. con-
clusive test. Yet this is not always infallible. If the extent of
the restraint upon one party is not greater than the protection
to the other party requires, the contract is reasonable and valid:
Roussillon v. Roussillon, 14 Ch. Div. 351; s. c. 19 Am. Law
Reg. 748. Thus, an agreement of a solicitor to relinquish the
practice of his profession in London, or within one hundred and
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fifty miles thereof (Bunn v. Guy, 4 East 190), or even if the prohi-
bition extends throughout the whole kingdom ( Whittaker v. Howe,
3 Beav. 3883), is valid; while an agreement of a dentist to abstain
from the practice of dentistry within a circuit of one hundred miles
was held void: Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735; s. c. 5 Moore &
Payne 768.
(b) Rule Stated.-Subject to the exceptions which will here-
after appear, the general principle may be thus stated: All contracts
in restraint of trade whose operation is general, are void. The
application of the rule is more difficult than a clear understanding
of it. Contracts to abstain from a business everywhere, or through-
out the realm, and, usually, contracts whose prohibition covers an
entire state, or a large part thereof, come within this principle.
(c) Application of the Rule.
(1.) Restraints extending everywhere.-A contract not to
carry on a business anywhere is clearly unreasonable, for its opera-
tion is general. It can be of no benefit to either party. And if
one agrees to abstain from a certain business at any place where the
vendee might carry on the same business, the agreement is unen-
forceable. Thomas v. Miles's Admrs., 3 Ohio St. 274 (1854; Hedge
v. Lowe, 47 Iowa 137 (1877); Gale v. Reed, 8 East 80 (1806) ;
Nossop v. Mason, 18 Or. Ch. (Ont.) 453 (1871); Kennedy v. Lee,-
3 Mer. 440, 451, 452 (1817); Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St. 519
(1853). So is an agreement to abstain from the business of brewing
at P. or elsewhere: Hinde v. Gray, 1 M. & G. 195 (1840) ; s. c. 1
Scott (N. S.) 128 ; see ( urtiss v. Gokey, 68 N. Y. 300 (1877) s. c.
5 Hun 555 (1875); Bank v. King, 44 N. Y. 87 (1870) ; Peltz v.
.Riehele, 62 Mo. 171 (1876); or coal merchant for nine months :
Ward v. Byrne, 5 M. & G. 548, 562 (1839); 13 Jur. 1175; or a
stipulation by one partner, on selling out his share, "to cease being
in that trade ;" Maierv. .foofman, 4 Daly (N. Y.) 168 (1871); or
a bond conditioned that the obligor shall never conduct or be
engaged in the yeast powder business; Callahan v. Donnolly, 45
Cal. 152 (1872); or in the business of founding iron; Alger v.
I'hacher, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 51 (1837).
(2.) Same. Throughout the Realm.-It is evident that a con-
tract not to pursue one's trade in the entire realm or country is
void, because the country suffers the loss of being deprived of the
restricted party's industry; and the party is deprived of his occupa-
tion,-or is obliged to expatriate himself in order to follow it. Oregon
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Steam Navigation Co. v. Tinsor, 20 Wall. 68 (187 8). Thus, a
stipulation not to be connected either "directly or indirectly" in
the manufacture of stearin candles for a specified time in any part
of .the United States is void : Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St. 519
(1853). So is an agreement between partners engaged in manufac-
turing daguerreotype materials, on dissolution, that one shall never
engage 'in that business again in any part of the United .States.
Dean v. Emerson, 102 Mass. 480 (1869).
(3.) Same. Throughout a State.-It has been held that a bond
not to engage in the business of asphaltum roofing and pavement-
laying in the city or county of San Francisco, or state of Califor-
nia," is void: Moore v. Bonnett, 40 Cal. 251 (1870); or never to
engage in the business of manufacturing and selling shoe-cutters at
any place within-the state of Massachusetts: Taylor v. .Blanchard,
13 Allen 870 (1866); or to abstain from running a steamboat on
any of the waters of California : Wright v. Ryder, 36 Cal. 857
(1868). These cases proceed upon the theory that if such contracts
were upheld, the one bound would be compelled to transfer his
residence and allegiance to another state in order to pursue his
avocation. Judge SELDEN, of the New York Supreme Court, in
answer to the contention that no restraint could be general which
operated in a single state only, denounced it to be repugnant to
"the general frame and policy of our government to regard the
Union, in respect to our ordinary internal and domestic interests,
as one consolidated nation. For all these purposes, each state is a
s9parate community, with separate and independent public inter-
ests." 'Lawrence v. Kidder, 10 Barb. 641 (1851). "But this mode
of applying the rule," says BRADLEY, J., (Oregon Steam Naviga-
tion Co. v. Winsor, supra,) "must be received with -some caution.
This country is substantially one country, especially in all matters
of trade and business, and it is manifest that cases may arise in
which it would involve too narrow a view of the subject to condemn
as invalid a contract not to carry on a particular trade or business
within a particular state. Suppose the case of two persons asso-
ciated in business as partners, and engaged in a manufacture by
which they supply the country, but the process of manufacture is a
secret; and they agree to separate, and one of the terms of their
separation is, that one of the parties shall not sell the manufac-
tured article in Massachusetts, where the other resides and carries
on business; and that the latter shall not sell the article in New
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York, where his associate is to reside and carry on business. Can
any one doubt that such an agreement would be valid ? Stearns v.
Barrett, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 442 (1823). Contracts in sale of process
of secret manufacture of articles which restrain the vendor from
engaging in the manufacture of them are valid. Cases must be
adjudged according to their circumstances, and can only be rightly
judged when the reasons and grounds of the rule are carefully
considered." Accordingly, upon the sale of a steamboat, a covenant
not to run it on the waters of the state of California was sustained.
Oregon, &c., Co. v. Winsor, supra.
Judge CHRISTIANOY'S views on this question fully accord with
those of the Supreme Court of the United States. And he sus-
tained a bond given by a printer and publisher, whose business
extended throughout the state of Michigan, stipulating never to
carry on that business within that state. Beal v. Chase, supra.
See remarks of this judge, ante. Upon principle, the latter view
is undoubtedly the correct one. Contracts which embrace the entire
state must be determined upon the same principle as those which
contemplate a general restraint.
(4.) Same. Throughout a large portion of a .State or Country.-
The same reasons which have been given-for declaring contracts in
general restraint of trade void, apply with equal force to those
which seek to deprive a large portion of a state or country of the
restricted party's labor. The same evils follow in both cases. Thus,
a stipulation of a dentist not to practise dentistry within a circuit
of 200 miles in diameter, in England, is void: Horner v. Graves,
7 Bing. 735 (1831). So is a contract that the vendorwill not carry
on the perfume business at any place within 600 miles of London :
Price v. Green, 16 M. & W. 346 (1847); S. c. 13 M. & W. 695; or
that he will not engage in manufacturing or trading in palm-leaf
beds or mattrasses, in all the territory of the state of New York,
west of Albany: Lawrence v. Ridder, 10 Barb. 641 (1851).
(5.) Same Commerce upon the High Seas.-If these contracts
restrain, or tend to restrain, unreasonably, commerce upon the high
seas, they are equally void for the same reasons that declare them
invalid on land. For the benefit of all nations that strive for com-
mercial supremacy, this enterprise should be free from restrictions.
Therefore, if one ocean steamship company agrees with another to
abstain from running ships between North and South America, the
contract is invalid: Alurray v. landerbilt, 39 Barb. 140 (1863).
IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE. 285
(6.) Same. Conf:ned to Locality, but subject to Covenantee's 8elec-
tion.-In Thomas v. Miles's Administrator, 3 Ohio St. 274 (1854),
one party covenanted not to carry on a certain business at any place
where the other party might carry on the same business. This
case decided that where the restraint is confined to -localities, if
they are not definitely ascertained, and their location is subject to
the vendee's selection, the contract is void because of its too general
operation.
(7.) Time.-A limitation as to time is never a necessary element
in determining the validity of these. contracts. If the restraint is
unreasonable as to space, the contract is void, however limited as
to time. There are good reasons for this. The public is injured
during the continuance of the restriction. Between a perpetual
and limited restraint the only difference is the degree of mischief.
It is well to remember that if the public is injured in the least, this
is sufficient to nullify the agreement. On principle, the degree of
injury, as affecting the validity or invalidity, ought never be con-
sidered. Thus, a contract of an innkeeper, upon selling his inn,
to abstain from business for ten years (2/ossop v. Mason, 18 Grant
Ch. R. (Ont.) 453 (1871)), or a coal merchant, not to follow his
business for twenty years (Ward v. Byrne, 5 M. & W. 548, 562
(1839); 3 Jur. 1175), or a manufacturer not to manufacture cer-
tain kinds of articles for a period of thirty years, have been con-
demned (The Saratoga Co. Bank v. Bank, 44 N. Y. 87 (1870)).
See, also, Bowser v. Bliss, 7 Blackford (Ind.) 344; s. c. 43 Am.
Dec., 93, with note, which holds that if the duration is indefinite
as to time, this will not invalidate the contract.
8. Restraints removable at the Option of the Party bound.-
It has been questioned whether agreements should be declared void
which reserve to the party bound the power to remove the restraint
upon paying a bonus to the other party, and it was decided that
they were equally void: Keeler v. Taylor, 53 Penn. St. 467. No
one has a right to consent to the payment of tribute for the purpose
of exercising a calling. Every man holds his freedom in trust for
the public. Society is entitled to the fruits of his toil. In refer-
ring to the restraint in the above case, the court said: "Is it
reasonable to impose such a tribute upon the labor of a mechanic?
Is not its direct tendency to restrain his skill in a useful art? And
even if at law damages might be recovered for breach of such a
contract, ought a court of equity to enforce it ? According to the
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doctrine of the cases, these questions will admit of no answers favor-
able to the plaintiff. He was not the patentee of scales, selling his
right to another; nothing of that sort appears in the case. It was
a sale merely of his handicraft, and whilst the parties were free to
fix their own value of that, a contract that restrained the industry
of the defendant, not in a particular locality, but everywhere,
* * * was contrary to public policy."
(d) Exceptions to the Rule.
I. Olassification of Exception.-As has been stated, there
are exceptions to the general principle that all contracts in general
restraint of trade are void. These exceptions may be classified as
follows :
1. Where the vendee requires the protection secured by the
restraint ; or
2. Where the contract is made to put an end to ruinous compe-
tition ; or
3. Where the advantages secured by the contract are mutual; or
4. Where the contract, is given to protect a patented invention,
trade-mark, or secret process of manufacture; or
. Where the business restrained is contrary to the policy of the
law where made. These will be considered in the order enume-
rated :
ii. Exceptions considered.
(1.) Where the Vendee requires the protection secured by the
restraint.
(a) Scope of Principle.-This exception, like the general rule,
cannot be applied to all classes of cases without limitation. Its
application is only extended so far as to afford a fair protection to
the vendee, yet not so far as to conflict with the public weal. Pri-
vate interests must succumb to the public welfare. But if the
promisee's business requires the restraint, and to protect him in
in it would not deprive the public of any advantage, the contract
will be enforced. For to enforce a contract which deprives the
public of any advantage, although the interests of the promisee
requires it,'would be to give protection to a private citizen at the
expense of the public, and deny society the power of self-protection.
If we keep in mind the reasons of the principles, which have been
heretofore stated, the scope of this exception will be more readily
understood.
(b) Cases where applied.-The interests of the promisee may be
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considered in two classes of cases, namely: 1. Where the restraint
is strictly for the protection of the promisee, with reference to the
extent of the business, and 2. Where it secures to the promisee
the exclusive custom of the promissor..(1) In the first class of cases there is apparent conflict in the
decisions. In England some cases have made the protection of
the promisee the controlling element in determining the validity
of the restraint. In Boussillon v. Roussillon, L. R., 14 Ch.
Div. 351; (s. c. 19 Am. Law Reg. 728, note by Judge BENNETT,)
a traveller for a wine merchant, in making his contract of employ-
ment, agreed not to carry on the wine business for two years
after leaving the merchant's employment. The promisee's business
extended throughout England and Scotland, and like business done
anywhere in the kingdom would interfere with his trade. It was
contended that a restraint which extended throughout an entire
country could not be upheld, even if the business of the promisee
did require the protection, for that would compel the party thus
bound to abandon his regular calling, or expatriate himself in order
to follow it. The court, in sustaining the contract on the ground
that the interest of the promisee required it, repudiated this con-
tention, and declared that the operation of such a limitation would
be unjust; that it would afford complete protection to a business local
in its nature, while it would deny protection to a business extending
throughout a kingdom. Then, according to the doctrine of this
case, it follows as of course, that the restraint is reasonable, if the
promisee's business requires it, however injurious the consequences
to the public. Rather than adopt a rule which might operate
unequally, the court preferred to ignore the public policy which is
the foundation of the whole doctrine, and declare that in such cases
the restraint may legally be co-extensive with the business.
Other English cases have likewise extended this exception. And
an agreement of a solicitor to relinquish the practice of his profes-
sion in London, or within 150 miles thereof, (Bunn v. Guy, 4 East
190); or even if the restraint extends throughout the entire king-
dom ( WittaAer v. Howe, 3 Beav. 383), was sustained for the reason
that the promisee required the protection.
In this country this principle has never been extended so far.
Yet contracts have been declared valid that required the vendor to
remove from a state in order to pursue his accustomed avocation in
deference to this principle of protection: Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich.
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490; Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall. 67;'bat,
as heretofore observed, upon this question there is some conflict :
Lawrence v. Kidder, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 641. When Judge BRAD-
LEY, of the United States Supreme Court, declared that when by
such restraints "the party is deprived of his occupation, or is
obliged to expatriate himself in order to follow it," he gave the true
limitation of the exception. "A contract," continues he, "that
is open to such grave objections is clearly against public policy."
.But if it only affords "a reasonable ground of benefit to the other
party, it is free from objection and may be enforced." 20 Wall.
67. Thus, upon the sale of a steamship, a stipulation of the pur-
chaser that he would not employ the ship for ten years in the waters
of California, where it appeared that such a stipulation was for the
benefit of the other party, and also that such was the inducement
of the sale, was held binding. Id. Compare this with Wright v.
Ryder, 36 Cal. 342, where a similar agreement was held void. And
a bond given by a printer or publisher, whose business extended
throughout the state of Michigan, upon the sale thereof, never to
engage again in such business within the state, was sustained.
Beal v. Chase, 31 -Mich. 490 ; see Ainsworth v. Bentley, 14
Weekly Rep. 630; Ingram v. Stiff, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 947; Jones v.
Lees, 1 Hurl. & Norm. 189 ; Allsop v. Wheatcroft, L. R., 15 Eq.
59, 64.
Where the restraint only zecures to the promisee the exclusive
custom of the promisor, it will be held valid. Thus a contract
not to buy meat of any one but the promisee for six months is valid.
Lightner v. Menzel, 35 Cal. 452 (1868) ; so is an agreement of a
publican to purchase all beer of his creditors : Thornton v. ,Sher-
ratt, 8 Taunt. 529 (1818) ; see Holcombe v. ffawson, 2 Camp. 391
(1800); or an agreement to furnish one party with sewing-machines
upon credit and at a discount, provided the other party will deal
with him exclusively: Brown v. Rounsavell, 78 Ill. 589 (1875); see
.Fisken v. Rutherford, 8 Gr. Ch. (Ont.) 9 (1860) ; or to deal with a
certain grocer exclusively, Lenz v. Brown, 41 Wis. 172 (1876);
see BHoltz v.-Sehmidt, 59 N. Y. 253; Weaver v. Sessions, 1 Mar-
shall 505 (1815) ; S. c. 6 Taunt. 154 ; Gale V. Reed, 8 East 80
(1806); or to employ no person but A. to make cordage for C. &
D. : Lawrence v. Kidder, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 641 ; or an agreement of
one railroad company with another to employ no cars but the latter
company's in the transportation of locomotive engines and tenders
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over the former company's road: Erie Railroad Co. v. Union Loco-
motive 4 Express Co., 35 N. J. L.240 (1871).
2. Restraints to put an end to Ruinous Competition.-
Contracts which have for their object the prevention of ruinous
competition have been sustained on the ground of the benefit the
public derives from them, as well as the parties thereto, in the
advancement of the particular trade or industry they seek to pro-
tect. There is much danger to be apprehended in extending this
principle too far; but, when properly applied, private capital is
thereby saved from disastrous rivalry, and enabled to add to the
wealth of the community, thus exerting a wholesome influence upon
the industrial or business interests of the state. The propriety
of sustaining such contracts is seriously questioned by those who
believe implicitly in the maxim, that " competition is the life of
trade." It is to be observed that here the same limitation, as here-
tofore stated, in referring to the interest of the promisee, namely
the agreement must not injure the public-holds good. The essen-
tial question is one of monopoly andinjury to the public. On this
ground, an agreement among the stevedores of a certain port to
divide the stevedoring business, and share profits and losses
arising therefrom, was sustained in England. Collins v. Locke, L. R.,
4 App. Oas. 674; 28 W. R. 189; Whart. on Cont. §§ 442, 442a
and notes. The court of the same country, also, declared valid
an agreement between two railroad companies, based upon the
exchange and division of traffic, for the same reasons. Hare v.
Railroad Co., 2 Johns. & H. 80; 30 L. J. Ch. 817; see, also,
Shrewsbury Railroad Co. v. London, &c., Railroad, 20 L. J. Oh.
90, 102. But no contract of the latter kind has ever been sustained
by the courts of this country. In another English case three rival
trunk and box-makers entered into an agreement by which they
divided England into three districts, each taking one, and each
engaging not to interfere with the trade of the others. It appear-
ing that this was done to prevent loss and inconvenience resulting
from all doing business in the same territory, the contract was held
valid. Wickens v. -Evans, 3 Y. & J. 318 (1829). And similar con-
tracts have been upheld in this country, where -good reasons
appeared for making them, and their operation was limited,-and
where they did not cause a monopoly of the business they endeavored
to advance. Skrarink v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522; Per-
kins v. Lyman, 9 Mass. 522 (1813). On the other hand, like
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agreements, whose avowed purpose was to stimulate and encourage
trade, but whose tendency might injure the public, have been held
void. Morris Run Coal Co. v. Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173 ; Arnot
v. Coal Co., 68 N. Y. 558 ; Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 85 Ohio St. 666;
India Asso. v. Kook, 14 La. Ann. 168.
3. Where the Benefits secured by the Contract are mutual.-
The policy of the law is to encourage and protect individual enter-
prises. Therefore, contracts which secure mutual advantage to the
parties are always held valid, unless clearly detrimental to the well
being of society. These may be ranged under the following heads:
(a) Agreements of Joint Inventors.-Anagreement between two
joint inventors of a certain machine that one should sell them
exclusively in two states and the other in the rest of the United
States, is valid because of the reciprocal advantage given to the
parties: Stearns v. Barrett, 1 Pick. 443 (1823).
(b) Agreements to secure Benefits of an Invention.-If, for the
purpose of securing the benefit of an invention, a contract is made
to put no machines upon the market without it, it will be sustained:
Jones v. Lees, 1 H. & N. 189- (1856) ; 2 Jur. N. S. 645 ; N. L
J. Exch. 9; Billings v. Ames, 32 Mo. 265 (1862).
(c) Agreements to Labor exclusively for a particular .Person.-In
this class of cases no agreement will be sustained whose effect is to
withdraw permanently and absolutely from the market any specific
quota of labor by which the market would be improved: See note
of Dr. Francis Wharton to Sharp v. Whiteside, 19 Fed. Rep., p.
166. But a contract to sell lime ekclusively to a certain person
for six months is valid: Schwan v. Holmes, 49 Cal. 665 (1875);
or mint oil for two years. Van Harter v. Babcock, 23 Barb. 633
(1857); or all ore that the promisee may need: Long v. Towl,
42 Mo. 545 (1868); or to labor for no other person than the
promisee for seven years: Pilkington v. Scott, 15 M. & W. 657;
or for life: Wallis v. Day, 2 M. & W. 273 (1837); 1 Jur. 73. On
the same principle, contracts of authors to write exclusively for
particular publishers will be enforced: Norris v. Coleman, 18
Vesey 437 (1811); Stiff v. Cassell, 2 Jur. (N. S.) 348 (1856).
Likewise engagements of actors and opera singers to give their ser-
vices for a specified season: Acaull v. Braham, 16 Fed. Rep. 37
N. . Cir.-Ct. N.Y. (1883). To same effect, see Howard v. Hop kyns,
2 Atk. 371; Fox v. Scard, 33 Beav. 321; Jones v. Seamans, 4 Ch.
Div. 636; Barnes v. MrcAllister, 18 How. Pr. 534; .P!essle v. Reese,
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29 Id. 882; Warren v. Jackson, 46 Id. 889. In some cases con-
tracts for the abandonment of a business, in consideration of being
furnished with employment for life, will be sustained: Wallis v.
.Day, 2 M. & W. 278 (1887); 1 Jur. 73; 15 Vin. Abr. 823. See
Hartley v. Cummings, 5 C. B. 246 (1847); s. c. 2 0. & K. 433;
s. c. 12 Jur. 57 ; 17 L. J. C. P. 84; Pilkington v. Scott, 15 M.
& W. 657; or, in consideration of becoming part owner of. a
patent, to conduct exclusively the business of manufacturing and
dealing in machines of that patent: Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 18
How. (U. S.) 289 (1855).
4. Contracts to. protect Patented Inventions, Trade-Aiarks and
Secret Processes of Mfanufature.-The law looks with favor upon
contracts which have for their object the protection and encourage-
ment of patents, trade-marks and secret processes of manufacture.
Therefore, in the sale of these articles, covenants of the vendor
not to enter into competition with the vendee are valid: Patents.
-- Morse 4 Twist -Drill, Jc., Co., v. Morse, 103 Mass. 73
(1869); sale of patent pen, Mackinnon Pen Co. v. Fountain Ink
Co., 48 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (16 J. & S.) 442, 447 (1882). Sale of
Secrets.-ffagg v. Darley, 47 L. J., N. S. Ch. Div. 567 (1878) ;
s. c. 38 L. T., N. S. 812; Bryson v. Whitehead, 1 Sim & Stu. 74
(1821); s. c. 1 L. J. Ch. 42; Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare 241
(1851); Green v. Tolgham, 1 S. & S. 889 ; Williams v. Williams,
3 Mer. 158; Yovatt v. Wingard, 1 J. & W. 894; 30 L. J. Ch.
209, 213, 219; Wyatt v. Wilson, 1 M. & G. 46; Albert v. Strong,
1 Id. 25; Tipping v. Clarke, 2 Hare 383; 24 Eng. Oh. R. 883;
Brewer v. Lamar, S. 0. Ga. 18 Cent. L. J. 54; Gillis v. Hall,
2 Brewster 842 ; s. c. 7 Phila. (Penn.) 422 ; 27 Leg. Int. 1870, p.
302; Hard v. Seeley, 47 Barb. 428; Leather Cloth Co. v. Lor-
sont, L. R., 9 Eq. 845 (1869); Alcock v. Giberton, 5 Duer (N.Y.)
76 (1855); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452; Vickery v. Welch,
19 Pick. 523. "Public policy requires," as was said in one case,
"that when a man has by skill or by any other means obtained
something he wants to sell, he should be at liberty to sell it in the
most advantageous way in the market, and in order to enable him
to sell it advantageously in the market, it is necessary that he
should be able to preclude himself from entering into competition
with the purchaser :" Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsant, L. R., 9 Eq.
854, 355.
5. Business restrained contrary to Policy of the Law.-Contracts
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in restraint of a business condemned by the policy of the law are
good. The reasons of this principle are obvious. The policy of
the law is only to promote and encourage those trades and employ-
ments which advance the public welfare. Therefore, any pursuit
which the laws of a country or state seek to restrain, may be
restricted, for it is not within the protection of the law. Thus,
if the public policy of a state, as evinced by legislative enactments,
is directed to suppress the liquor traffic, such business may be
restrained within that state's borders: Rarri8on v. Lockhart, 25
Ind. 112 (1865). The liquor traffic is injurious to the public inter-
ests, and hence the reasons of the rule protecting other employments
does not apply to this one, and, therefore, it cannot be said to be
within the rule. The public sentiment of Indiana has always been
against the liquor traffic. " The legislature enacted the law in
question upon the assumption that the manufacture and sale of
beer, &c.,. were necessarily destructive to the community:" Beebe
v. The State, 6 Ind. 520. Laws were- passed in the reign of
Edward III., Henry III. and Henry VIII., prohibitory in their
character, of the sale of liquor. In the time of Henry III. an act
was passed disqualifying persons engaged in such employments
from holding any office of a judicial or executive character. Early
in the present century, in our country, movements were commenced
among the people which, to a greater or less extent, have from time
to time influenced legislation, and at present the traffic in intoxi-
cating liquor, as a beverage, is absolutely prohibited in some of the
states of the Union: 25 Ind. 114. See, also, -Dixon v. U. S., 1
Brock. (MS. Dec.) 177, for illustration of contract restraining
business against public policy.
VII. PARTIAL RESTRAINTS.
(a) Criterion of falidity.-The same general principles which
govern contracts in general restraint of trade, apply with equal force
to contracts which contemplate a partial or limited restraint. Con-
tracts of the latter kind are valid and binding. Angier v. Webber,
14 Allen (Mass.) 211; Mitehel v. Reynold8, 1 P. Wins. 181 ;
Noble v. Bates, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 807; 10 Mod. 27, 85, 180; 7
Mod. 230; 2 Saund. 156 A. N. (1); 2 Str. 789; 2 Ld. Raym.
1456; 3 Bro. P. C. 849; Br. Ch. 418; 5 T. R. 118; 5 Cow. 144
and 150 N.; 3 Johns. Cas. 297; 7 Johns. 72; 18 Wend. 590;
17 Wend. 454; 21 Id. 162; 10 Paige 123; 10 N. Y. 244; 68
IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
N. Y. 304; 8 Barb. 45; 11 Id. 134; 12 Id. 381; 4 How.
-Pr. 408; 9 Id. 838; 13 Id. 238; 84 Id. 205; 51 Id. 378;
1 E. D. Smith 581. No rule as to the exact extent of territory
covered by these restraints can be given: the restraint will
be considered limited and valid if it is not unreasonable. .Pyke
v. Thomas, 4 Bibb (Ky.) 486; 7 Am. Decisions 741, and note;
Roussillon v. Roussillon, L. R., 14 Oh. Div. 351; s.c. 19 Am. Law
Reg. 748, and note. The point of difficulty, in these cases, is to
determine what is a reasonable distance within which the prohibitory
stipulation may lawfully have effect. "And it is obvious at first
glance," remarked BRADLEY, J., (Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Win-
sor, 20 Wall. 64, 68, 69), "where it is larger and wider than the
protection of the party with whom the contract is made can possibly
require, such restraint must be considered unreasonable in law, and
the contract which would enforce it must be therefore void."
fitcheock v. Coker, 6 Ad. & El. 454, "that this must depend
upon the circumstances of the particular case; although, from the
uncertain character of the subject, much latitude must be allowed
to the judgment and discretion of the parties. It is clear that a
stipulation that another shall not pursue his trade or employment
at such a distance from the business of the person to be protected,
as that it could not possibly affect or injure him, would be unrea-
sonable and absurd. On' the other band, a stipulation is unob-
jectionable and binding which imposes the restraint to only such
an extent of territory as may be necessary for the protection of the
party making the stipulation ; provided it does not violate the two
indispensable conditions that the other party be not prevented from
pursuing his calling, and that the country be not deprived of the
benefit of his exertions."
(b) Rule stated.-The principle, as deduced from the authorities,
so far as concerns space, is that the validity depends upon the rea-
sonableness of the contract, and there is no other rule limiting the
area over which the contract may legally extend. The contract
must be considered with reference to the situation, business and
objects of the parties, and in the light of all the surrounding cir-
cumstances with reference to which the contract was made; and if
the restraint contracted for appears to have been for a just and
honest purpose--for the protection of the legitimate interests of the
party in whose favor it is imposed, reasonable as to them, and not
specially injurious to the public-the restraint will be valid.
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Hubbard v. Miller, 27 Mich. 15 (1873), per CHRISTIANCY, J. ; se6
.Leggott v. Barrett, 43 L. T. Reports (N. S.) 641. In Roussillon v.
Roussillon, L. R., 14 Ch. Div. 351, it was stated that if the extent
of the restraint upon one party is not greater than protection to the
other party requires, the contract is reasonable and valid. It is
obvious that the principle is too broadly stated. If the protection
of the promisee required the other party to give up his calling, and
deprived the public of the benefit of his exertions, the contract is
clearly against public policy. The principle thus extended would
certainly be harmful to the public, and ought never be applied with-
out limitation.
(c) Reasonableness of the Restraint a Question of Law.-Whether
the restraint is reasonable with reference to territory is a question
of law, to be decided in view of the circumstances of each particular
case. Gilman v. Dwight, 13 Gray 356 ; Taylor v. Blanchard, 13
Allen 370; Treat v. Melodeon, 35 Conn. 543; Guarand v. Dan-
delet, 32 Md. 561; Grasselli v. Lowden, 11 Ohio St. 349; .4Z'cAl-
lister v. Howell, 42 Ind. 15 ; Linn v. Sigsbee, 67 Ill. 75 ; Hedge
v. Lowe, 47 Iowa 137; Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 157;
Jones v. Reavens, L. R., 4 Ch. Div. 636.
(d) Application of the Bule.-If the business sold is extensive,
a greater restraint will be permitted than in case of a business neces-
sarily local or limited in its nature. An agreement not to practise
law in London, or within 150 miles thereof, is valid. Bunn v. Guy,
4 East 190 ; so is an agreement of a publisher, covering the same
space. Tallis v. Tallis, 1 El. & B1. 391; 17 Jur. 1149; 22 L. J.
Q. B. 185. An agreement of a milliner, upon sale of her business,
to abstain from conducting ' the same business within such distance
as might interfere with-the business sold, is valid. Morgan v. Per-
hamus, 36 Ohio St. 519; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 607. And a covenant
of a miller not to engage in the milling business within 80 miles
of a certain place is reasonable; Bowser v. Bliss, 7 Black (Ind.)
344; s. c. 43 Am. Dec. 93, with note; so is a contract of a physician
not to practise medicine within 20 miles of a given place: Butler v.
Burleson, 16 Vt. 176; see also Hayward v. Young, 2 Chitty 407;
Gravely v. Barnard, L. R., 18 Eq. 518; 43 L. J. Ch. 659; 30 L.
T. (N. S.) 863 ; covering a distance of 10 miles: Cook v. Johnson, 47
Conn. 175; Bets'sAppeal, 10 W. N. C. 431; or 12 miles: Mcolurg's
Appeal, 58 Pa. St. 51 ; or 15 miles: Miller v. Elliott, 1 Ind. 484, is
also reasonable; or 'an apothecary not to conduct an apothecary
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shop within 20 miles of the old stand: Hayward v. Young, 2
Ohitty 407 ; see also Sainter v. Ferguson, 7 C. B. 716 ; s. c. 13
Jur. 828, where an agreement not to act as an apothecary within 7
miles of a certain town was held valid; or a lawyer not to practise
law within 21 miles of a certain place: JDendy v. Henderson, 11
Exch. (H. & G.) 194; 24 L. J. Exch. 326; see Linn v. Sig8bee,
67 Ill. 75; or a merchant to abstain from the mercantile business
within 10 miles of the business sold, Gompers v. Bochester, 56
Penn. St. 194 ; see Haldeman v. Simonton, 55 Iowa 144 (1880).
It is reasonable for a butcher to agree not to engage in his busi-
ness within a distance of 5 miles: Elves v. rofts, 10 0. B. 239;
or a gas-fitter not to engage in his business for a distance of 20
miles: Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Ad. & El. 438 ; or not to conduct the
business of manufacturing soap within 40 miles of a place: Boss
v. Sadgbeer, 21 Wend. 166; or not to carry on a saddlery and
harness shop within 20 miles of a place: Nobles v. Bates, 7 Cow.
307; or within 10 miles of a place: Jones v. Heavens, L. R., 4 Oh.
Div. 636: see, also, Harrison v. Lockhart, 25 Ind. 112; Curtiss v.
Gokey, 68 N. Y. 300; 8 Scott N.R. 674; 7 M. & G. 969; 8
Jur. 105; 14 L. J. o. P. 10; Taylors v. Clark, 2 Show. 350;
Jollie v. Broad, 2 Roll. Rep. 201; s. c. Noy 98; Prugnell v.
Gosse, Alleyn 67 ; Noah v. Webb, 1 Edw. Oh. (N. Y.) 604; Dan-
kin v. Williams, 11 Wend. 67 ; Middleton v. Brown, 47 L. J. . S.
Oh. Div. 411 ; Benwell v. Inns, 24 Beav. 307 ; s. c. 26 L. J. Oh.
663 ; Shackle v. Baker, 14 Yes. 468.
On the same principles, agreements not to follow a business in a
county, Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St. 517 ; see Weller v. Hersee, 10
Hun (N. Y.) 431; Dean v. Emerson, 102 Mass. 480; or in a
limited territory: Richardson v. Peacock, 33 N. J. Eq. 597 (1881);
Avery v. Langford, 1 Kay 663 (1854) ; or a large portion thereof,
Id. ; or over a certain limited route over which the vendor was in
the habit of conducting his business, are reasonable and valid: An-
gier v. Webber, 14 Allen 211 (1867); Dunlop v. Gregory, 10 N.
Y. 241 (1851); Ohappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. 159 (1839);
Archer v. Marsh, 6 Ad. & El. 959 (1837); Leighton v. Wales, 3
M. & W. 545 (1838); Davis v. Barney, 2 Gill & J. (Md.) 382
(1830); Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223 (1811); Westfall v. fapes,
3 Grant Cas. ( Pa.) 198 (1855); Homer v. Ashford, 3 Bing. 322
(1825) ; Boutelle v. Smith, 116 Mass. 111 (1874) ; -Ewing v. John-
son, 34 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 202 (1864); Mumford v. Gething, 6
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Jur. (N. S.) 428 ; s. c. 29 L. J. C. P. 105; 8 W. R. 187 ; 1 L. T.
N. S. 64; 7 0. B. N. S. 305. So agreements to relinquish the
practice of a profession within the limits of a town : Doty v. Martin,
32 Mich. 462 (1875) ; Dwight v. Ramilton, 118 Mass. 175 (1873);
Mott v. Mott, 11 Barb. 127 (1851); Niver v. _Rossman, 18 Barb.
50 (1853); Haldeman v. Simonton, 55 Iowa 144 (1880); Gi-
man v. Dwight, 13 Gray (Mass.) 856 (1859); Cook v. Johnson,
47 Conn. 175 (1879); Smalleyv. Green, 52 Iowa 241 (1879);
Zimmerman v. Devin, 17 W. Rep. 230; s. c. 23 Am. L. Reg.
50 (1883), note; or city, Mallan v. May, 11 M. & W. 652 (1848);
or to abstain from a business in a town, Grundy v. Edwards, 7 J.
J. Marsh. (Ky.) 868; s. c. 23 Am. Dec. 409; Pike v. Thomas, 7
Am. Dec. 741; Heichew v. Bamilton, 3 G. "Green (Iowa) 596
(1852) ; Gompers v. Rochester, 56 Pa. St. 194 (1869) ; .Hoagland
v. Segur, 88 N. J. L. 280 (1876); Whitfield v. Levy, 85 N. J. L.
149 (1871); Roller Co. v. Ott, 14 Kan. 609 (1875); Clark v.
Crosby, 37 Vt. 188 (1864); or city, Green v. Price, 18 M. & W.
695 (1845); s. c. Price v. Green, 16 M. & W. 846 (1847); Wintz
v. Voyt, 3 La. Ann. 16 (1848); Viegas v. Forshee, 9 Id. 249;
Muller v. Vettel, 25 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 85Q (1864); Colmer v.
Clarke, Cas. temp. Hardwicke 135; Beard v. Dennis, 6 Ind. 200
(1855); Goodman v. Henderson, 58 Ga. 567 (1877); Thomas v.
Adair, 3 Ohio St. 274 (1854); Stewart v. C6hallacombe, 11 Brad-
well App. (Ills.) 879 (1882); Dakin v. Williams, 11 Wend. (N. Y.)
67 (1833) ; Pierce v. Woodward, 6 Pick. 206 (1828), have been
enforced. This principle is" applicable to all kinds of occupations
and professions: Smalley v. Green, 52 Iowa 241; Whittaker v.
Howe, 8 Beav. 383, 393, per Ld. LANGDALE; and the contract is
valid whether made by parol or bond, Thompgon v. Means, 11
Sm. & Mar. (Miss.) 604; Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223; Mitchel
v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181; Alger v. Thacher, 19 Pick. 51; or
with an alien: Roussillon v. Boussillon, L. R., 14 Ch. Div. 851.
The restraint may operate upon a third person: Presbury v.
Fisher, 18 Mo. 50; Gilman v. Dwight, 13 Gray (Mass.) 356, or
it may begidi in the future : Butler v. Burleson, 16 Vt. 176 (1876);
Grasselli v. Lowden, 11 Ohio St. 349, and the damages for a viola-
tion may be liquidated: Miller v. Elliott, 1 Ind. 484; Duffy v.
Shockey, 11 Ind. 71; HYoagland v. Segur, 88 N. J. L. 280 ; and,
like general restraints, indefiniteness as to time does not affect their
validity. Jacoby v. Whitmore, 49 L. T. (N. S.) 835 ; Cook v. John-
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son, 47 Conn. 175; Hastings v. Whitley, 2 Exch. 611; Bowser
v. Bliss, 7 Blackf. 344 ; Ward v. Byrne, 5 M. & W. 548 ; Allsopp
v. Wheatcroft, L. R., 15 Eq. 59; Catt v. Tourle, L. R., 4 Ch.
App. 659; Perkin v. Clay, 54 N. H. 518.
(e) .Presumptions.-The law presumes all contracts in restraint
of trade bad, if nothing more appears: Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P.
Wins. 181; Mallon v. May, 11 M. & W. 653; Chappel v. Bro ckway,
21 Wend. 157; -Hoffmanv. Brooks, 11 W. L. Bull (0.) 258; Bozer
v. Bliss, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 344; .orner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735;
Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pinney (Wis.) 123; s. c. 3 Chandler (Wis.)
133; -Elves v. Crofts, 10 0. B. 247; W. Va. Tel. Co. v. Ohio
R. P. L. Co., 22 W. Va. 600; Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223
But see ilubbard v. .Miller, 27 Mich. 15, per OHRISTIANCY, J.,
and whether this presumption is overcome is a question of law:
Tallis v. Tallis, 1 El. & Bl. 391; Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pinney
123; Bowsen v. Bliss, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 344; Lum v. Sigsbee, 67
II. 81. If the petition does not show facts sufficient to overcome
this presumption, it is bad. Metzger v. Cleveland, 3 Indiana Law
Magazine, 42, 44; Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St. 519, 528.
(f) Conideration.-The petition, to be good, must not only
show that the restraint is partial, but it must also show that the
contract is founded upon a valuable consideration,-and that it is
reasonable and not oppressive. Thomas v. Mills, 3 Ohio St. 275;
Brewer v. Marshall, 4 Green Ch. 537; Wright v. Ryder, 36 Cal.
357; Holbrook v. Waters, 9 How. Pr. 335; Dunlop v. Gregory,
10 N. Y. 241; Ohappel v. Brocekway, 21 Wend. 157; Holmes v.
Mfartin, 10 Ga. 503 ; 2 Pars. on Cont. 753; Mitchell v. Reynolds,
I Smith's Lead. Cas. 724, with instructive note; Lange v. Werk,
2 Ohio St. 528. Some cases have laid down the rule that the con-
sideration must be adequate: Homer v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735; Young
v. Timmins, Tyr. 226; Long v. Towl, 42 Mo. 545; Mitchel v.
Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181 ; but the weight of authority is against
this rule: Collins v. Locke, L. R., 4 App. Cas. 674; Hitchcock v.
Coker, 6 Ad. & E. 439; Duffey v. Shockey, 11 Ind. 70; G'rasselliv.
Louden, 11 Ohio St. 349 ; Archer v. Marsh, 6 A. & E. 959; G3ravely
v. Barnard, L. R., 18 Eq. 518; Leigeton v. Wales, 3 M. & W. 545;
Ward v. Byrne, 5 Id. 548; Pilkington v. Scott, -15 Id. 657 ;
McClurg's Appeal, 58 Pa. St. 51; P rice v. Green, 16 M. & W.
346; Lawrence v. Kidder, 10 Barb. 641; Middleton v. Brown,
Eng. Ct. App., 47 L.J. N. S., Oh. Div.411; Hubbard v. Miller, 27
VOL. XXXUI.-38
